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Theory and Practice in Law 
On the Magical Role of Legal Technique 
 
 
Abstract. Law is characterised by a fundamental gap between its social embeddedness and 
the apparently formal automatism it operates, which gap is basically bridged by the law’s 
ultimate practicality under the guise of its mere logicity. This seeming contradiction is 
resolved by judicial decisions as responsible and responsive practical actions which are to 
result from the necessary conceptual transformation(s) of the law’s wording in the course of 
its official application, which does involve a necessary jump in logical derivation. This is to 
say that on final analysis and in practical terms, law is what gets actualised through the actual 
uses of it. Black-box effect such as this is helped by the variety–and owing to the magical 
transforming effects–of legal techniques. Eventually, it is legal culture that provides a 
medium in which legal techniques can at all be selected and used. On a conceptual plane, 
one of the filters is offered by legal dogmatics. This very complex includes dialectics as 
well, for there is no motion without counter-motion, therefore, it is not realistic to pursue 
any human ambition without some safety valves inserted. Or, regarding, e.g., law, no homo-
genisation is feasible without some re-heterogenisation at the same time. Paradoxically 
speaking, while modern formal legal development went in the direction to mechanise the 
judge, the realisation was also made that law had ever been too serious an undertaking to be 
just left alone to the logification by some impersonally formalistic apparatus. Therefore, 
simultaneously with the very first act of formalisation, law has ever built in its scheme the 
possibility of de-formalisation as well. It is this complex understanding that was implied by 
Kelsen’s successive rewriting his pure theory with changing shifts of emphasis. All could 
suggest is that the ultimate certainty is eventually nothing else than we ourselves. Or, in 
addition to the law itself (as conceptualized in the systemicity of a doctrine), social actions 
and authoritative acts under the label of law are also in a constant competition for defining 
what will eventually be acknowledged and also practiced as law. 
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“The Sollen, the form of norm of a hypothetical proposition 
is in most cases therefore not the component of the positivated 
legal order but the a priori normative-logical basic form of it.” 
 
(István Losonczy 
A funkcionális fogalomalkotás lehetősége a jogtudományban 
{The availability of functional concept-formation in jurisprudence} 
[Budapest: Királyi Magyar Egyetemi Nyomda 1941], p. 65) 
 
According to its classical understanding, legal technique covers the entire 
process from law-making to law-applying, in contrast with the simplification 
by some recent literary elaborations that would handle it as an instrumental 
know-how of legislation only. However, as so called law-making gets actualised 
through law-applying by gaining a definite meaning and primary significance 
in it, it is basically still the range of problems connected with law-applying 
that is at stake here. Or, we might say: there is something that is law, on the 
one hand, and there is something that is legal policy (denoting the entire 
mesh of social interconnections within which a country seeks to achieve some-
thing), on the other, and legal technique is meant to serve as a bridge between 
the two. 
 In our present-day understanding, on the final analysis law is a profession in 
the service of conceptualities framed in given ways and composition as wrapped 
into a rigidifying formality, characteristic of the law’s modern formal ethos, 
with logicity and formalistic entrenchment as decisive features by now. That 
is, formal law builds around itself a system to be treated and referred to with a 
kind of geometrical ideality, and it demands a model of justification that is 
usually required only for drawing theoretical conclusions. Notwithstanding all 
this, in reality the judge is by far not an entity simply reducible to a logical 
automaton but a being permeated with all qualities and fullness of any human 
existence. So even if he is covered by the robe particular to his role, he keeps 
on irrevocably carrying all his further social roles as well. While attempting–in 
compliance with his professional expectations–to disregard everything falling 
beyond the competence defined for his profession, he is aware that he takes 
responsibility for his decision and thereby also for the way he is shaping living 
law, by putting his ethical ego to the test. 
 Perceiving the specificity of the function to be filled by law in the gap 
between the law’s social embeddedness and apparently formal automatism, 
George Lukács described the process in a way that the judge has to face a 
genuine social conflict, communicated to him as a controversy also in a legal 
sense, that is, as the logical contradiction of opposing claims, supplied by the 
parties to the case. However, his profession is made a lawyerly craft or art 
exactly by his ability to find a sufficiently formulated solution in law that can 
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refine the controversy to an illusory and transcended conflict, solved in and by 
the law.1 
 And the question of what goes on meanwhile was described by the analytical 
attempt at reconstruction by Alexander Peczenik over the past decades,2 summed 
up in the notions of “transformation” and “jump”. Thereby, his doctrinal expla-
nation turned into a self-contradiction, as in the wake of the classic debate 
between Georges Kalinowski and Chaïm Perelman, representing the positions 
of formalism and anti-formalism (which debate ended conclusively for me 
with the legal relevance and explanatory force of the latter),3 he had opted for 
formalism, having declared inexorably the need that decisions be deducible, 
that is, logically unambiguously inferred. In result of his failure in this very issue, 
eventually he arrived at a self-critical (and in view of formalism, also self-
annihilating) self-restriction, which he introduced exactly due to the notions 
of “transformation” and “jump”, by proving the repeated forced interruption of 
any logical chain in legal reasoning. Otherwise speaking, that what has become 
an illusory and transcended conflict in the above sense out of the said contro-
versy was regarded by him as the result of necessary conceptual transforma-
tion(s) which therefore involves a jump in the logical derivation–that is, a 
categorical evaluation (through reflecting the abstract normative patterns onto 
the fragmentary but qualified description of the facts of the case, taken out 
from a compound life situation), at the completion of which the judge may by 
now declare that the matter has become reassuringly clear for him to reach his 
  
 1 Lukács Gy.: A társadalmi lét ontológiájáról I–III [The Ontology of Social Being]. 
Magvető, Budapest, 1976. as well as, from the author, The Place of Law in Lukács’ World 
Concept, Budapest, 1985. 193 pp. 
 2 Peczenik, A.: Non-equivalent Transformation and the Law. In: Peczenik, A.–Uusitalo, J. 
(eds.): Reasoning on Legal Reasoning. Vammala, 1979. 47–64., as well as, from the author: 
Theory of the Judicial Process The Establishment of Facts. Budapest, 1995. 249 pp. 
 3 Namely, it was the purely theoretical philosopher Perelman who expressed as his 
astonishing opinion that it was enough of legal philosophers and it was also good time for 
lawyers to come and explain the process–just like the centipede of the story when he was 
asked how he could walk with hundred legs (and afterwards he could not take one single 
step just pondered how he could nevertheless walk)–, and we ourselves had to finally 
reconstruct from the lawyers’ narratives what went on actually and how. At the end of all 
such reconstructions, legal technique would turn out to be capable of the world’s most 
genuinely creative achievements. And finally, it was on such a basis that he could state that 
our European continental legal ideals were not just outdated but had nothing indeed to do 
with reality, as they only constituted the mere facade of a professional ideology with 
extremely creative acts going on behind the scene. In more details, cf., from the author: On 
the Socially Determined Nature of Legal Reasoning. Logique et Analyse (1973), Nos. 61–
62, 21–78. and in: Perelman, C. (ed.): Études de logique juridique V, Bruxelles, 1973. 21–78. 
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judicial conviction so that he can already decide in the given way by rejecting 
any other alternative(s). Of course, from now on it is also visible that this 
endpoint does not any longer presume a creative act in a logical sense. There-
fore, once the jump has taken place in the transformation, that what–so to 
speak–follows will from then on also derive obviously with logical formality 
and necessity. 
 The paradigmatic basis of such a multiple professional attitude is provided 
by the recognition that in both language and law, everything is ambivalent 
and nothing is compelling by itself. This is just the antipode of the founda-
tional idea of Imre Szabó’s work on The Interpretation of Legal Rules,4 written 
half a century ago as an emblematic epitome of socialist jurisprudence, 
according to which the law is given with a definite meaning from the outset 
and it is only in relation to this that interpretation may approve, extend or 
restrict a proposed meaning. But if everything is given from the beginning for 
those who apply it at any subsequent time, then legal technique, described as 
above, would generate something differing from what has been originally given. 
That is, within the perspective of normativism, the judge will necessarily misuse 
his authority if he extends or confines the law’s vigour beyond or within its 
originally defined scope. On the other hand, in the theoretical perspective 
outlined above with a focus on legal technique, in reality there is nothing that 
could be given. It is only a materialisation, actualisation and implementation 
ongoing constantly that we can perceive. After all, there is nothing but judicial 
event in the course of which a decision is taken and something will be actualised 
by this decision.5 Or, things get actualised through the actual uses of the law. 
And in this respect, legal technique indeed seems to be an all-embracing 
concept, used as good almost for all that may stand the judicial test through 
reconsiderations in appeal, until sealed by the legal force. If we ponder repeatedly, 
for instance, classical legal principles, then our interpretation can indeed so to 
speak freely be expanded or narrowed in function of the particular circum-
stances involved in the establishable facts of the case and therefore in a way 
  
 4 From Szabó, I.: A jogszabályok értelmezése [Interpretation of Legal Rules]. 
Budapest, 1960. 618 pp. and Interpretare a normelor juridice. Bucureşti, 1964. 439 pp. and 
Die theoretischen Fragen der Auslegung der Rechtsnormen. Berlin, 1963. 20. 
 5 This is what Wróblewski commented upon by stating that interpretation is either of a 
static or of a dynamic ideal. That is, the interpreter either constructs a conceptual world, by 
claiming that it testifies to the original meaning and then all we have to do is try to 
reconstruct it by all means, or we conceive of the responsible judicial profession as free, 
and formulate a task of adaptation for ourselves within it. Cf. Wróblewski, J.: The Problem 
of the Meaning of the Legal Norm. Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 14 
(1964) 3–4, especially 265 et seq. 
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scarcely influenced by abstract conceptual limitations but only judgeable 
exclusively on the plane of the actual and the concrete. In view of this, Kálmán 
Kulcsár had once good reason to assert in his legal sociology decades ago6 that 
there is at all time an individual (albeit sociologically generalisable) situation of 
law application: we have to decide at any time within the boundaries of an 
in-itself complete and unlimited situation of legal argumentation and reasoning, 
in which also our moral, our idea of man and of course even our concept of the 
Divine may have a role–in addition to all other considerations. For it is an open 
situation at least in a sociological sense, in which thoughts and alternatives of 
solution are formed while finally, as represented by the individual judge (and 
in function of his sociologically describable hierarchical dependence and further 
circumstances) and eventually an entire lawyerly community will have something 
accepted or rejected (within the confines of the prevailing legal culture and its 
institutional operation). 
 In contrast to the view represented by, e.g., Szabó above or to the reifying 
conception of usual simplifications, in legal technique (operating law while 
actualising a meaning to it) there is no before or after. For that what is given 
from earlier cannot be but sheer potentiality [dynamei] as it can exclusively 
become something of an ontological existence in a Lukácsian sense through 
practical legal operation, that is, as operated by the applied legal technique. 
Consequently, it is from the outset two different media (and, through them, the 
intertwining of heterogeneous aspects) that are at stake and in play in law. 
There is a concentrated form, on the one hand, and a practical action, inseparable 
from everyday existence and driven by practical considerations, on the other–
and these two media are being continuously amalgamated. That what will in its 
own way emerge out of this as the message of the law arises at any time 
exactly from this amalgamation. 
 It was François Gény, having revealed the moment of enchantment in specific 
legal operation with techniques that may render available almost anything and 
its opposite, who did the most for the description of the actually ongoing 
process in law at the turn of the 19th to 20th centuries. Jean Dabin was the first 
one of all to reconsider the issue in the subsequent decades.7 Dabin had already 
raised awareness of the fact that there is some kind of a magical process taking 
  
 6 Kulcsár K.: A szituáció jelentősége a jogalkalmazás folyamatában [The significance 
of the situation in the process of law-application]. Állam- és Jogtudomány XI (1968) 
545–570. 
 7 Gény, F.: Science et Technique en droit privé positif I–II. Paris, 1913–1930 and 
Dabin, J.: La technique de l’élaboration du droit positif spécialement du droit privé. 
Bruxelles–Paris, 1935. 
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place in law. For in fact, law is hardly more than a kind of an open-ended 
mediation by pondering. In such a complex, there is a properly formulated 
form we usually call ‘law’ but this is far from being the end-point. This is some-
thing that will have to transform into any given and definite message through 
the practical life of (the) law. 
 The conjecture and the figurative message of the circumstance that the law 
is not something to arrive at but something wherefrom the overall specific 
move starts (a “path” that “channels” argumentation and reasoning in law) denote 
just the beginning of the recognition that, in this case as well, there may also 
exist something as legal culture, as a perhaps even more comprehensive and 
decisive notion than legal technique is. For it is legal culture that provides for 
the medium in which legal techniques can at all be selected. For instance, two 
early decisions of the Hungarian Constitutional Court on compensation for the 
damages caused by the Communist regime and on facing the crimes of the 
totalitarian past dealt with basic dilemmas of (to be addressed in merit as a sine 
qua non prerequisite to) any genuine transition from Communist dictatorship. 
Yet, with its formalistic decision a limine rejecting those bills, actually the 
Court annihilated the original claims themselves, instead of contributing to 
their solution. One of the characteristics of such and similar decisions, practically 
eliminating the very chances of a fundamental socio-political transformation, 
was precisely that, by having been squeezed into the sublime robe of 
“constitutionality” with some formal allusions to the Constitution’s wording on 
equality before the law in a Republic being based on the democratic rule of 
law, in fact the Court even declined to face the underlying social problem that 
should have been solved. Therefore, if and in so far as the activism of the 
Constitutional Court, relying on the in-advance awareness of the legal force of 
all those acts which it may have arrived at its free discretion without a 
compelling legal basis, was a fiasco in Hungarian history, we have to consider 
it the failure of the entire legal culture behind the applied legal techniques. 
Namely, our legal profession in general and our lawyerly elite in particular 
rejected indeed to assume those tasks of legal interpretation and legal technical 
operation (placing–by making use of legal principles, as the case might be–the 
law’s formal regulation into deeper and broader contexts), which the legal 
professions of other nations, more sensitive towards their nations’ fate and at 
least morally more responsible and responsive (e.g., in Germany or the Czech 
Republic), did in fact assume.8 
  
 8 Cf., e.g., Varga, Cs. (ed.): Coming to Terms with the Past under the Rule of Law 
(The German and the Czech Models). Budapest, 1994. The obstinate sterility of the 
survival of the skills and work-patterns reminiscent of the age of socialist legality, that is, 
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 As it became clear for me during the completion of one of my earlier 
papers (struggling with the dilemma of whether or not the law is reducible to a 
system of enactments9), legal change may have at least a dual path: it may 
take place either by a direct modification of the provisions concerned (this is 
classical legislation) or by re-shaping the hermeneutic medium of interpre-
tation behind the rule. Or, legal change may be direct and indirect. In the latter 
case, reconditioning and altering the law’s field of meaning, that is, the social 
conventionalisation that gives it a meaning, will bring about a practical 
modification of the message of the law. Of course, such a duality of feasible 
strategies may entail interactions, including crossing effects as well. For instance, 
the impact may be rather questionable when the acceptance of a regulation 
(to the reception of which the given society is by far not ready) is only due to 
force or a plot, lobbying or political blackmailing. In case of inflicting a 
regulation aimed at (e.g.) protecting national minorities merely by (external 
or internal) pressurising on an otherwise intolerant community, no success 
can be guaranteed by itself. A lasting change can scarcely be implemented in 
a legal culture once pushed into a difficult situation, if the whole society with 
its legal professionals will continue blocking any tolerance in the future. 
Meanwhile, reconsidering the range of problems underlying the present paper, 
a new feature can be added. Notably, an intention at strategically changing the 
message of the law (e.g., in the frame of modernisation through the law) may 
be provoked also by the long-term re-selection of legal techniques applied, 
without either formal modification of the rules or informal re-shifting of the 
social conventionalisation behind those rules. Accordingly, there is another 
indirect mode of changing or reforming the so-called living law. 
 To emphasise the decisive extent to which legal technique may shape the 
law’s practical purport,10 let me refer to René Dekkers who in his time arrived 
                                                      
the practical ignorance of legal principles and the aversion to undertake democratic 
decision-making, responsible indeed–in brief, the lack of familiarity with, and of genuinely 
participatory experience in, the jurisprudential style developed since the end of WWII in 
Western Europe–,with the threat posed by this to the European Union through our EU-
accession, is analysed by Kühn, Z.: Worlds Apart: Western and Central European Judicial 
Culture at the Onset of the European Enlargement. The American Journal of Comparative 
Law LII (2004) 531–567. 
 9 From the author: Is Law A System of Enactments? In: Peczenik, A.–Lindahl, L.–van 
Roermund, B. (eds.):  Theory of Legal Science. Boston–Reidel, 1984. 175–182. and Acta 
Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 26 (1984) 413–416. 
 10 See, e.g., from the author: Technique and Doctrine in Law. Iustum, Aequum, 
Salutare II (2006) 3–4 {in print} & < www.univie.ac.at/RI/IRIS2004/Arbeitspapieren/ 
Publikationsfreigabe/Csaba_Phil/Csaba_Phil.doc >. 
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at the conclusion that, properly speaking and on the final analysis, legal 
conceivability is mostly not a function of the law itself. For finding a solution 
conceivable in law or ensuring a path promising to lead to a given result in law 
scarcely means anything else than whether we are able rationally, through 
applying given legal techniques, to defend a certain standpoint better than 
others would another (or, in case of some pressing interests, we can defend it 
at all), with the logical demand for perfection which is usual in the given legal 
culture. Or, on the final analysis, what is at stake here is just justifying a given 
solution–with the exclusion of its rejection from the outset. Referring to 
historical examples, partial analyses in the multitude of various Western 
European and Anglo–American (etc.) practices (known to be used to setting 
legally high and sophisticated standards by the way) show such a diversity that 
we have to conclude: the least that legal conceivability demands is the limiting 
condition not to admit openly and with explicit textual formulation to be 
running against the text interpreted. And therewith the developments by Hans 
Kelsen on discretion and the moment of the legal force11 present themselves in 
a new setting–namely, instead of logical consequence, the lack of procedural 
rejection, and, as a final criterion, instead of the positive statement of logical 
inclusivity, the negative inertial force of the fact that the decision in question 
has not been actually annulled or overruled, by being expelled from the circle 
of the accepted regime of law and order in the legal process. 
 As can be seen, the arsenal of legal techniques definitely grants lawyers 
discretionary power to conclude–precisely due to the inherent ambivalence of 
any text–that, on the final account and in bordering situations, that what the 
basic social conventions of a nation’s culture consider important and vital 
enough to form a foundational component of its survival strategy will not be 
inconceivable ab ovo in most of the cases. This is what can be strikingly 
observed especially in times of crisis and above all in countries and epochs 
where and when a high-standard background culture of self-defence with 
the powerful representation of national interests has developed and is being 
persistently cared for; in particular contrast to the fatigue and the enervation, 
living aimlessly from day to day with no perspective and ability to do one’s 
utmost for good causes, a condition that can unfortunately be seen in the life of 
our nation, exhausted by the after-1956 repression and the strange transition 
therefrom. For the examples of vital impulse with a determination to survive 
are numerous from the Czech Republic to Romania and to Ireland, or from 
  
 11 Cf., e.g., from the author: A bécsi iskola [The school of Vienna]. In: Varga, Cs. 
(ed.): Jogbölcselet XIX–XX. század: Előadások [Lectures on legal philosophy in the 19th to 
20th centuries]. Budapest, 1999. 24–32.  
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the State of Israel to the United States of America. To be clear, it is the use of 
techniques and the ability to react by adequately responding to challenges what 
I mean here and now, rather than whatever emotional relation, sympathy, or 
identification. After all, all this does not necessarily imply more than the issue 
whether a social substrate has ever developed, a substrate that is able to decide 
(without debates generating discord internally and the very impossibility of 
performance externally) what the nation wants at all, at least in strategic 
directions and on the most sensitive fields; whether a kind of mechanism has 
evolved to facilitate that basic expectations, even if unsaid, can be tacitly 
agreed upon; whether the societal background is structured in a way that some 
dominant will can be formulated at least on given fields, and if necessary, also 
asserted to prevail–even if through most diverse paths and by roundabout 
means but, all things considered, even defying obstacles if needed.12 Based on 
the analysis of cases and from a certain historical perspective, all this is relevant 
as–in want of any other point of reference–we have to see that if properly 
significant interests are at stake as represented at proper levels, practically 
anything and also its opposite may have a chance of passing through the 
institutional test of legality in practice. And referring again to Kelsen’s 
wisdom in his theoretical reconstruction, this can be achieved by no means 
necessarily through any spectacularly flagrant defying of the law but just by 
building up those bridges of reasoning (based on scholarly comparative-
historical analyses in depth and the lawyerly talent in analysis, argumentation 
and inventiveness) that may render the solution in question conceivable in the 
given culture under given circumstances.13 
 The primary lesson of all this may be summarised in that no matter how 
exciting and flexible our language is, in itself and as a mediator, it is not 
suitable for definition. By legal technique, in fact, we mean the standardised 
set of instruments of how to handle a certain language lawyerly. Rules may 
involve norms (norms themselves being nothing but projections of logic, logifying 
denominations). Whether we act as philosophers or as linguists or lawyers, we 
have to apply categories in distinction, in order to enter into an intelligible 
  
 12 I attempted to clarify the components of such a favourable or unfavourable 
disposition through a comprehensive analysis in my opening lecture [‘»Worthy of the 
fate, qualified for the challenge«: On the state of our intellect and scholarship’ (in 
manuscript)] of a seminar for Hungarian history teachers in the Carpathian Basin, 
organised by the Rákóczi Association in the Benedictine Abbey of Pannonhalma during 
the summer of 2004. 
 13 Which may have even led, e.g., to collective responsibility instituted with reference 
to a law having lost its effect yet still allegedly surviving, in heritage of an earlier mandate 
rule. See note 10. 
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communication at all. Looking methodologically behind what we commonly call 
law, we can scarcely claim more than: in the world of the intellectual construct 
called ‘law’, so-called norms, mediated by conceptualities defined in rules, offer 
certain sets with paths of, and menu-references in, procedures within the insti-
tutional process generated by the same law–together with all the ambivalences 
inherent in its linguistic mediation. But this is just the recognition that Lukács 
once thematised in his social ontology as the trap of mediation, witnessing to 
the basic unity that prevails nevertheless, despite the world’s artificial fragmen-
tation through its human intellectual representation. For language is a medium 
incessantly formed–with the law’s and lawyers’ language, too–, being unceasingly 
re-conditioned by each and every actor of the law’s community in general and 
its dedicated professionals in particular, who actualise it while processing cases 
through its filter at any time. 
 According to our starting point, we all speak a language and language 
does not label itself. Any of us can say, for example, that now he enters the 
terrain of scholarship, by incorporating new conceptualities into this scholarship. 
Well, such an allegation may prove true (or verifiable) and false (or refutable) 
alike, as any of us may at any time expound in a meta-level reconstruction 
that the sequence of deduction has been false or that nothing but passions, 
uncontrollably visceral affections/aversions have been expressed in the guise 
of conceptuality, i.e., in a basically not conceptual language-use. Or, one can at 
all times identify a meta-system superior to all our linguistic communications, 
based on which new explanations may be formed about what has been told. 
 The language’s not labelling itself does also involve the perspective of that, 
according to official expectations at least, the more differentiated the society we 
live in, the less the law-applier’s distinctively individual personality will have 
a share in making his decision, and this is exactly the most decisive factor in the 
judge’s performing his function–whether he still wears his powdered wig visibly 
or it is present only hidden in his professionally socialised subconscious. 
Within himself, the judge has to distinguish between his individuality and his 
function defined for his legal quality. Yet no matter how unambiguous this is at 
the level of theory or formalised ideology, we have to reckon with the fact that 
any such official expectation is hardly more than a normative desideratum, that 
is, the law’s internal rule for its own game to be played (apart from the 
underlying social requirement which does not inevitably enforce itself). The 
duality inherent in this apparent antinomy is verified by sociological reality. 
Because insofar as the law is seen as a field of giving meanings, in shaping of 
which we all play a role (especially via our professionally competent lawyers), 
then whether we want it or not, the said field will necessarily be actually shaped 
by individual human beings through the filter of their own personalities. All 
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this entails the secondary effect (also described by Lukács) that shifts of emphasis 
and changes of context, maybe invisible in themselves, will inevitably emerge 
in the ontological process of our social actions, which may eventually add up 
to some decisive shift(s) of direction in the long run. That is, our professionalism, 
with our lawyerly ideology and skills in legal operation, will distinguish and 
homogenise us according to the requirements of the legal complex and to our 
understanding of the roles suited to it, on the one hand, but nevertheless, the 
unity and the individual expression of all these in our personalities and 
fullness of being are ontologically still inseparably all together present, on the 
other; and therefore, we can only try to separate aspects differing in homogeneity 
within the heterogeneity of such an ontological unity of existence for the sake 
of and within analytical purposes exclusively. The point under discussion 
may remind one of the stand taken by Lukács who, having pondered the 
tension between the sought-for unambiguity and actual ambiguity of language, 
characterised the development of civilisation and scientific thought over 
thousands of years as an implied fight for making language unambiguous, 
while basic objectives in practice are often realised in a hyperbolic way at the 
most. Notably, we usually set a goal and approach it as we can, yet, mean-
while, new divergences are inevitably getting introduced into the process–and 
the same is what happens to the judge as well. 
 Or, the judge’s personality, his individual character, together with linguistic 
ambivalences pervading mediation in all its forms–all these leave their marks 
on every operation. What we claim here is that in every artificial human 
construction there is some kind of homogenisation which at the same time 
carries its counterpoint to it. For example, in our civilisatory efforts, we place 
the law and the range of social problems to be addressed as legal into a well-
separated and thoroughly homogenised sphere, to which the legality of the 
law’s domain can be directly applied already. Nevertheless, we still cannot tear 
the whole process from the heterogeneity of its human carrier, which will 
inevitably lead to its overall definition by overall life conditions, that is, by all 
the particularity of the historically given hic et nunc. 
 As we have seen, language does not label itself, and it would downright be 
unfit for it. And yet we all speak a language, apparently the same language in 
the same community. The legislator is to write (after having read), and the law-
applier is to read (and then, also to write). More than a thousand years ago, in 
Iceland, the law was announced by the lagsaga [or lögsögumađur], reciting 
it standing on a rock. This may have been a practical gesture in itself, yet our 
present-day reconstruction may rightly regard it as something more: objecti-
fication, externalisation, rendering its factuality an independent act. It is such 
an objectification upon which, in our present-day complexity of modern formal 
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law, we have built a new professional aspiration, the so-called doctrinal study 
of law [Rechtsdogmatik], aimed at having a conceptual system formed out of 
what was told by the legislator and interpreted in authoritative practice. All 
this having been incorporated in our culture, today we presume almost by habit 
that, after the law was drafted by one of us as a governmental specialist, voted 
for by others of us as members of the parliament, commented on by yet another 
one of us as a jurisprudent, taken into account in legal transactions by others of 
us and, in the end, applied by the last of us as a judge in a conflict still arising 
between some former ones; well, we indisputably presume in our culture that 
all of us use conceptual instruments and, accordingly, understand texts and 
messages just in the way as conventionalised in our culture. Therefore, if any of 
us says “purposefulness”, this has to mean what our commentary and standing 
practice understand as ‘purposefulness’. Of course, the exchange in communi-
cation of social understandings and feedbacks is not coded in the text, and the 
speaker is mostly unaware of the complexity of layers behind a textual meaning, 
as he only spoke a language. Yet the meta-system of the language of conceptual 
reconstructions, superimposed upon language as used by us in our everyday 
life, asserts itself even in roundabout ways, assuming an in-depth and in-
volume more comprehensive concept behind the actual language usage. It is 
this role in which the doctrinal study of law proves to be an unexcludable 
mediator.14 And it is this context within the perspective of which we can state 
that legal technique, too, is unexcludably present anywhere where there is law 
with a practical use. 
 No need to add that the doctrinal study of law has its own technique(s), 
too, of course. Rudolf Jhering and Carl von Savigny described already in the 
second half of 19th century that this technique suggests a basically theoretical 
model–like what is customarily used, for example, in theological dogmatics 
and similar fields of scholarship–, where exclusively the logical instruments 
of conceptual analysis (starting out from given texts) and conceptualisable 
evidences or axioms are utilised. Consequently, the analytical apparatus of 
the doctrinal study of law applies mostly classical types of logical operation, 
  
 14 Marx and Engels may have rightly written in The German Ideology in the above sense 
that the Germans have once drowned their misery into scholarship, and what they failed 
to achieve through revolution they finally built up in theoretical doctrine. It is worth 
mentioning that a similar duality prevails in Anglo–American culture as well, but there this 
role is played by the judge’s conscience. Therefore the genuine issue is to whom to allocate 
the power of the doctrine. For that what is a scholarly-made doctrinal study of law for us in 
the European continental (German) pattern is the practical construction from case to case 
for the Common Law. Cf., e.g., Atiyah, P. S.: Pragmatism and Theory in English Law. 
London, 1987. 
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including, above all, conceptual division and classification and, of course as 
assigned to these, deduction and induction. Notwithstanding this, that what has 
been told about the magical transforming effect of legal technique is built not on 
the primacy of logifying instruments but sees in law basically a technique of 
argumentation. According to this, the various forms of argumentation (with the 
help of which the judge, by considering various presumably feasible positions 
more or less relevant in one sense or another, gets closer to answering the 
dilemma of the applicability of various rules) appear as elements of the legal 
technique applied by him. 
 It was in an explication written on the function of law and its correlation to 
the function of codification three decades ago15 that I came to realise that in 
socialism, the acknowledgement of rights only in function of their “proper” 
exercise as spirited by the Civil code had the same function as categorising a 
deed’s being dangerous to society as the criterion of criminal offence had in 
the Penal code. However, my initial political indignation calmed down to silent 
melancholy later on, when I also realised that this is nothing more than quite 
commonly the jurisprudence based upon so called clauses, which is in fact 
the same age as legal culture. It is precisely the Lukácsian symptom already 
mentioned in connection with linguistic ambiguity that re-emerges here. 
Notably, in our civilisatory development, we are trying to limit discretion by the 
means of law, in order to prevent the judge’s personality–along with included 
irrational factors as well as with factors ensuing from differing rationalities–
from affecting the judicial discernment. At the same time, we incorporate 
clauses of immense generality into the system so that the judicial assessment, 
bound this way, can nevertheless be freed and the otherwise relevant legal 
provision put aside, if needed, in any unforeseeable border situation at any 
time. It is precisely this issue that Ronald Dworkin thoroughly discussed in his 
famous essay–“Is Law a System of Rules?”16–, having risen by today to be the 
paradigmatic cornerstone of Anglo–American legal thought. In his opinion, the 
challenge of creativity begins exactly when the judge, stepping out from his 
self-comforting everyday routine, finds that the judgeability of his case is hard 
and problematic and, as such, requires re-consideration. This is the culmination 
of the complex socio-legal determination of the judicial process, when the law-
applier may identify a legal principle out from either the Roman law’s common 
  
 15 Cf., from the author: The Function of Law and Codification. In: Anuario de Filosofia 
del Derecho 7 Madrid, 1973–1974. 493–501. and Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum 
Hungaricae 16 (1974) 269–275. 
 16 Dworkin, R. M.: Is Law a System of Rules? [1967], reprinted in his The 
Philosophy of Law. Oxford, 1979. 38–65. 
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heritage or domestic jurisprudential precedents, and once the latter’s relevance 
is established, he will forbear from applying minutely elaborated sets of rules.17 
Of course, we may have distressing memories about the socialist use of the 
clause on the proper exercise of rights, for instance, when the political police 
was hard on retaliating upon the sociable gatherings of the banned elderly monks 
as an abuse of the right of assembly. However, it must not be forgotten that 
the simultaneous cult of clauses had, on principle, the same aim in Western 
Europe, namely, to foresee the unforeseeable. Otherwise speaking, there is neither 
legislator nor living legal culture without incorporating clauses according, of 
course, to the prevailing cultural patterns. Such were, for instance, the concepts of 
“common good”, “public order” (etc.),18 used in fields ranging from public 
administration to civil and criminal law in the West, which seem to have since 
the last decades lost their primacy unfortunately, on account of some false 
liberalisation and individualistic anarchism.19 
 Providing that we consider such resolutions problematic, we have to 
inevitably presume an ontology in which unidirectional definition is available 
on the field of social action. In comparison to such simplicism, Lukács himself 
proved to be far more differentiated. His explication into the opposite direction 
was built exactly on the presumption that there is no motion without counter-
motion, therefore it is not realistic to pursue any human ambition without some 
safety valves inserted. Moreover, no homogenisation is feasible without some 
re-heterogenisation at the same time. Paradoxically speaking, while modern 
formal legal development went in the direction to mechanise the judge, the 
realisation was also made that law with its irrevocably ethical colour had ever 
been too serious an undertaking to be just left alone to logifying highbrows who 
would, as it were, process it with their impersonally formalistic apparatus. 
Therefore law has ever built in the scheme, simultaneously with the very first 
act of formalisation, the possibility of de-formalisation as well. 
 Well, legal technique is in itself quite an omnipotent and universal instrument 
which can be used by anyone for any purpose in any direction, on the one 
  
 17 In this sense, we might as well say that the gap is in us at the most, that is, any problem 
that there may be is attributable to the applier of the law, because the legal order is perfect 
in the form it is done available to us. That is, the cause of problems may be that until now 
we have failed to activate it in the sufficient depth, exploiting its classical theoretical 
foundations. 
 18 Cf., above all, Bolgár, V.: The Public Interest: A Jurisprudential and Comparative 
Overview of the Symposium on Fundamental Concepts of Public Law. Journal of Public 
Law 12 (1963) 13–52. 
 19 Cf., e.g., from the author: Rule of Law–At the Crossroads of Challenges. Iustum, 
Aequum, Salutare [Budapest] I (2005) 73–88. 
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hand, yet, one that can exclusively be operated in (and according to feasibility 
criteria set by) a given legal culture, on the other. Consequently, there is one 
given legal culture inevitably destined for us to build that what will define 
the frames within which we can at all move, by offering us those paths in 
practice which will decide on the final account from what we may–by being 
encouraged to–conclude to what in fact. As to its genuine root-components, 
legal culture is, on the final analysis, an incessantly re-actualised progressing 
network of social conventions, within the womb of which certain skills, selected 
from among the huge many skills spread in the various civilisations, are utilised 
with a given intellectuality and according to a given ethos and a given goal-
rationality. For instance, there is a logico-analytical culture–the cult of conceptual 
analysis spread over from Oxford as taken over from the field of philosophico-
ethical investigations to law–in which our actions depend on one single 
formalistic consideration, in conclusion of some previously posited assumption, 
according to which even options of whether I may express a feeling of sympathy 
or when I am authorised to kill my foetus, my mother, and so on, will possibly 
be definable with a dry logic. Nonetheless, I hope it is still thinkable that we, 
as sound souls and worthily of our human quality, do not wish to rely in our 
actions on the logic of abstract conceptual extrapolations as substitutes for 
individual moral responsibility. For so many issues were thought to be proven 
on paper as inferred from theories throughout history, yet in sober societies 
and communities we do not act expectedly as automatons, exactly because we 
think in a more complex way, trusting our numerous human faculties and the 
many talents bestowed on us. And with all this we presuppose, at least as a 
potentiality, that our backgrounding human culture may also develop the 
arsenal of further finely chiselled instruments as well. 
 In addition, in a last analysis it is also obvious that it is the same legal 
culture having already produced the most strictly formulated rules to be applied 
on a mass scale that has also made rights a function of the proper exercise of 
rights and categorised the fact of being actually dangerous to society as one of 
the criteria for a deed to be qualified as a crime. Hence, unlawful acts were not 
due to clauses themselves provided for in socialism, either. For it is the same 
ruthless dictatorship that subordinated everything in every field, every way and 
under any circumstances to the political purposes of that central or local 
despotism (dominated basically by the personal intentions of individual party 
potentates) which also brutally totalised society. All things considered, it is 
exactly the use of so-called clauses as a legal technique that is accidental; but it 
is clearly inevitable on the level of social totality that where a homogenised 
sphere is built up also a safety valve has to be wedged in in order to ensure 
social heterogeneity to prevail, even if most exceptionally, in the very last 
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resort. Comparing societies and epochs, often a close parallel can be observed 
between a given legal culture and the use of some adequate culture of legal 
technicalities. Within this, it is of course tradition and the inherent urge of 
skills already practised that are to decide which particular instruments of legal 
technique will be finally recoursed to. 
 Almost this same duality (or jump into the opposite) manifests itself in our 
example referred to earlier, namely, in the Constitutional Court’s decisions on 
compensation and facing with the criminal past of socialism during the political 
transformation in Hungary. For there is no–and has never been any–expressed 
constitutional provision20 on the basis of which their adjudication would have 
not allowed a much more moderate decision or eventually even abstention 
from, or just the opposite of, the extreme decisions that were actually made. 
Remarkably enough, when the justices were giving official reasons, their 
justification was limited to sheer formalism. In doing so, they were drawing on 
the so-called “invisible constitution”, that is, on one exclusively posited in 
their imagination. However, on expiry of their mandate–i.e., of the exclusively 
enforceable limit of their activity–, when they may have felt that the memory 
of their past activity and its assessment by the posterity were already at stake, 
their subsequent attempt at justification proved rather material. This is what we 
call acting by double standards. And so also was that when they declared to 
adopt the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg European Court for ruling henceforth 
(of course, again, without any authorisation, i.e., purely out of their own 
decision), our lawyerly community welcomed the news once “materially” and 
with enthusiastic applause, while at another time the same community only 
murmured that this was nothing but discretionary goal-rationality, that is, 
legally speaking, plain arbitrariness.21 At times, therefore, it seems that we get 
  
 20 Unless we think of the constitutional description of the Republic of Hungary defined 
as a “democratic state under the rule of law” (Article 2/1), where the definiendum can only 
indicate cultural ethos rather than codified ways and conditions. See, e.g., for the nature and 
variety of understandings of the key term, Fallon, R. H., Jr.: »The Rule of Law« as a 
Concept in Constitutional Discourse. Columbia Law Review 97 (1997) 1–56. 
 21 I find it somewhat similarly frivolous to say now, for instance, that the Consti-
tutional Court’s past activism in its first decade may have been adequate to the conditions 
then but it would be no longer timely if it went on similarly later on. For the Constitution 
has not changed meanwhile, consequently the Constitutional Court’s statutory mandate to 
adjudicate constitutionality has been the same from the beginning. And the mere fact that 
the Constitutional Court has no forum to be appealed against, wherefore each of its actions 
in procedure has from the outset had the seal of constitutional force on it, must not have 
entitled it to any acts at will. That is, we need to clarify also theoretically if an activism 
legally so unfounded by the wordings of the Constitution (but having so far-reaching social 
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enticed to adopt blind positivistic attitudes only to suddenly switch over into 
the charismatic contentuality of self-liberation. 
 We might add that, at the same time, all this involves the availability of a 
strategic change of law as mediated by modifying either the context and/or 
the legal technique as well. Because whether or not this was consciously 
foreplanned by the Constitutional Court’s consideration, eventually the path 
actually taken had proven to be the strategically safest one, with an effect 
irreversible and irrevocable, as the Constitutional Court, by the same token, 
also accomplished the job of doctrinal conceptualisation when it formulated (in 
a way rather sophisticated) the grounds for its decisions in question. For, as 
known, the “invisible constitution” (if this may signify a sensible term at all) 
indicates a conceptually elaborated system behind the Constitution’s textual 
wording, a kind of dogmatics rendered by constitutional force under the 
Constitutional Court’s seal.22 And it does so with an effect that, even if one or 
                                                      
consequences at the same time) is just one of the feasible materialisations of the free 
discretion that can be resorted to optionally or, otherwise speaking, discretion is not verging 
on abuse only provided that it will not have reached to acting as legislative or even 
constituent power. Because exclusively the elimination of “unconstitutionality” can be 
understood by the test–or adjudication–of “constitutionality” in a literal sense, that is, 
according to the Constitution’s provision in force at its execution. When Lord Acton 
summed up the experience of several millennia–saying that “power tends to corrupt and 
absolute power corrupts absolutely”–, he himself did not mean anything more than that 
law, especially in issues of a dramatic impact for the public, is by far not the automatic 
result of the possible lack of further formalistically posited delimitations. 
 For he was of the opinion that “Historic responsibility has to make up for the want of 
legal responsibility. Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great 
men are almost always bad men, even when they exercise influence and not authority: still 
more when you superadd the tendency or the certainty of corruption by authority. There is 
no worse heresy than that the office sanctifies the holder of it.” Lord Acton’s letter to 
Bishop Mandell Creighton on April 5, 1887, in his–Fears R. J. (ed.)–Selected Writings 
Essays in the Study and Writing History. Indianapolis, 1986. 383. 
 22 As the president’s concurrent opinion to the decision 23 of 31 October, 1990 holds, 
“the starting point is the totality of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court has to continue 
determining in its interpretations the principled bases of the Constitution and the rights laid 
down thereby and establishing a coherent system by means of its judgments, which as an 
»invisible Constitution« serves as a standard benchmark of constitutionality above the 
Constitution which is nowadays being amended in everyday political interest”. Cf.  
Sólyom, L.: Introduction to the Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Hungary. In: Sólyom, L.–Brunner, G. (eds.): Constitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court. Ann Arbor, 2000. 41 et seq. Cf. also Sajó, A.: 
Reading the Invisible Constitution: Judicial Review in Hungary. Oxford Legal Studies 15 
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two decisions may be circumvented singularly in one way or another, surely a 
whole conceptually elaborated system cannot, because with such a step we would 




If we claim that in the realm of classical positivism, law is a reified entity with a 
completely ready-made set-up and with boundaries given from the outset for 
the outside world, and this (along with the appropriate lawyerly culture and 
professional deontology) also involves the expectation that the law can be applied 
deductively as processed through our lawyerly logic; but if, in the guise of 
theory, now we also declare that all this is nothing but a mode of parlance until 
it becomes actually present and applicable for the jurist exclusively through an 
established meaning assigned to it–well, then we do not necessarily tell more 
than what Kelsen did once. For this tempting intellectual dead-end was fore-
seen by his philosophical reconstruction already (and with a tension induced 
by its internal contradiction) when in the second half of his life he concluded 
that in a legal sense, there is no “murder” (and, consequently, no “lawfulness”, 
no “constitutionality” and “unconstitutionality”, that is, no whatever legal qualifi-
cation) in and by itself. There are nothing but procedural positions within the 
realm of law. And if, by the force of any of these, the judge declares now that 
you are a murderer or a woman, then it will be completely indifferent in a legal 
sense what you actually did or what your gender is in reality. What will matter 
for law is exclusively the decision arrived at procedurally by the authority, 
which once will be sealed by the legal force, will from then on also be utterly 
indisputable–as long as the given legal order prevails. Well, my above explanation 
relieves somewhat the austerity of normativity. Namely, although in terms of 
this explanation, reification in law is only an appearance in epistemology, as 
exclusively exchanges of meanings and attitudes conformed to the latter are 
traceable in society ontologically; however, the latter still constitute a kind of 
continuum constantly moving and changing, shifted and re-shifted again in their 
tendencies with changing contexts, yet with elements built upon each other 
reliably; and thereby, they also will build into a kind of uninterrupted sequence of 
progress (irrespective of the fact that the law may suffer, as the case may be, 
no change in its objectified, textual form). 
 Simplifyingly expressed, traditional legal positivism is a position against 
natural law, emphasising that there is a worldly identifiable maker of the law, 
                                                      
(1995) 253–267. and Füzér, K.: The Invisible Constitution: The Construction of Constitu-
tional Reality in Hungary. International Journal of Sociology 26 (1997)  48–65. 
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as opposed to the classical natural law’s stand that traces validity back to a 
source transcending this law. In the light of such a duality, my point is on the 
borderland, as it doubtlessly (and maybe also astonishingly) proclaims a kind 
of invisible democratisation. After all, although law has both a particular maker 
and a definite circle of addressees in the light of what has been said above, yet 
inevitably and incontestably we are all there in the work of law–that is, all we 
in society, even if represented, for the most part, by jurists (justices and lawyers) 
who practically apply the law. I would even add that it was rather ironical for 
me to expound this just during socialism in Hungary, as such an allegation 
does involve that there are limits even to despotism, for each and every 
addressee of the law actually takes part in one way or another in the processes 
of giving meanings to law and thereby making it–again: in one way or another–
reconventionalised. 
 Nevertheless, our established culture of developing meanings in law may 
derive itself only from norms authoritatively issued. And this necessarily 
embodies the ontic process, sociologically describable as a fact, in terms of 
which society as a circle of addressees conventionalises it while acquiring it. 
The question arises whether this can be anything else or more than a kind of 
Kelsen-reinterpretation. Well, although Kelsen’s aim might have been quite the 
opposite,23 by the further elaboration of his Pure Theory of Law he had 
actually relativised all the law’s components, thrusting us back into a kind of 
uncertainty and sheer accidentality. Because he built up, with endless austerity, 
a pyramid-like theory of gradation [Stufenbau], offering a logified picture on 
the structure and operation of the whole set-up of law with inexorable 
consistency, excluding any contingency, on the one hand.24 However, with the 
American publication in 1946 of the re-formulation of his work25–in which he 
elevated the moment of the legal force into a criterion set–, he had rendered all 
this relative, on the other. This way it has become clear that within the field of 
  
 23 Because–as István Losonczy himself once noted it–, according to the law’s “dogmas” 
[A mulasztás I: A mulasztási bűncselekmények okozatossága {The default, I: The causality 
of crimes of default} Pécs, 1937. 70], Kelsen built up “the doctrine of legal forms” [A 
funkcionális fogalomalkotás lehetősége a jogtudományban {The availability of functional 
concept formation in jurisprudence} (Királyi Magyar Egyetemi Nyomda, Budapest, 1941), 
p. 90], wherein he used the concept as “a law of sequence building”, as a “sequence of 
functions propounded within a definite law” [ibid., pp. 25 & 81, meaning by ‘law’ here the 
regularity established by sciences], albeit the “syncreteness of [legal] law is nothing but 
[…] the result of the particularity of such [scientific] laws that constitute the [legal] law” 
[A mulasztás, p. 73]. 
 24 Kelsen, H.: Reine Rechtslehre. Wien, 1934. 
 25 Kelsen, H.: General Theory of Law and State. Cambridge, Mass., 1946. 
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discretion in which such a simultaneous application and making of the law 
takes place, in fact everything and also its opposite may occur. This is all the 
more so because the very question of what is application–i.e., what is that can 
be regarded, from a normatively higher level in hierarchy, as pre-defined for 
the lower level–can be exclusively answered from a procedural position entitled 
to official reconsideration or revision (as anything else can only be taken as a 
private opinion), and thus, any optional element or consideration, even if outside 
the law, may, in case it becomes legally final by the seal of a res iudicata, get 
incorporated forever into the law, despite its eventually random contents. Well, 
on the final account, it seems as if Kelsen’s entire oeuvre accentuated nothing 
but this: although the law has a logifiedly solid framework, built up laboriously 
and at the cost of great efforts, yet if anyone really wanted to take it into his 
hands, the structure would suddenly crash and just slip away like grains of 
sand. 
 In the spirit of the above, we usually say that, all things considered, law 
defines itself. However, this, examined closer, may turn out to be misleading, 
because we can exclusively speak of its (being incessantly in the course of) 
getting defined. For this is a process of self-generation in which a normative 
factor is given, with reference to which we may attempt to define its meaning 
for ourselves (in our positions as judges, attorneys, lawyers, etc.); at the same time 
our version of meaning is confronted with that of others, which communication 
of meanings eventually adds up to continuous re-conventionalisation. This 
understanding of the law is, on the final analysis, nothing but a social–institu-
tional–praxis theory. It suggests that the ultimate certainty, starting out from 
which Kelsen would have tried to intellectually reconstruct the world of law 
with its structure and operation out of some elementary stones as experienced, is 
eventually nothing else than we ourselves. 
 As a matter of course, it was by the end of his life that Kelsen actually 
could arrive at what could serve for me already as a starting point. Namely, 
when as explanatory principles he introduced the moments of both legal force 
and efficacity (i.e., the factual acceptance of that it is exclusively an order by 
and large being already enforced about the validity of which we may speak 
sensibly at all), he actually already concluded backwards from a social end-
result as a total result, and obtained by reduction that what he can now build 
up the law from. So, from the moment I started re-considering Kelsen’s theory 
of law-application,26 I could recognise only this path as acceptable. 
  
 26 From the author: Kelsen’s Theory of Law-application: Evolution, Ambiguities, Open 
Questions. Acta Juridica Hungarica 36 (1994) 3–27. 
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 Accordingly, the closed-open system that characterises the relation of what is 
inside and what is outside the law (with the movement inside the law) is itself 
nothing else but a continuum, displaying features of a particular autonomy only 
from an analytic point of view. We can define its foundation, outlines and 
contents basically only from the facts of practice as from the last empirical donné 
[‘what is given’, as once formulated by Gény] that we can reconstruct at all. It 
is this wherein the sense of excluding the availability of normative logical 
conclusions from law lies, as thereby we resolve all this in a feasible reconstruc-
tion from actual practice. For practice testifies both continuity and reliability. 
For jurisprudence as the living practice of law, characteristic of a country or of 
an epoch, can by and large certainly be described as a sequence of consecutive 
steps in harmonisation with and conformity to each other in the light of 
posterior reconstruction.27 
 If we asked again whether law defines itself and whether this is true in all 
respects both inside and outside the law, we might perhaps respond to the above 
by referring to the ideal picture of three intertwining circles.28 According to 
this, there is a constant movement going on objectively in the total societal work 
of shaping the law. The components taking part in this movement, pressing 
against each other, are (1) the legally relevant attitudes in society, (2) the 
actual judicial decision-making practice, as well as (3) the posited law (with 
the law’s doctrinal aspiration to define itself in Rechtsdogmatik). In the incessant 
whirl of the subsequent actions by the various actors in (1) social action, (2) 
legal action, and (3) the law, we can be assured of one circumstance at least: at 
last, it can always be described–at least posteriorly–which of them will prevail 
(if at all) in their struggle. In addition and on the last analysis, one of them may 
become predominant irrespectively of which specific legal doctrine is being 
enforced in the given society at a given time. That is, the process of their being 
pressed against one another with one of them becoming (relatively or absolutely) 
predominant is bound to take place anyway. And our repeated statement on 
that law eventually defines itself and that, in this self-determination of getting 
defined in the given situation, only the given (and not another) status (or 
qualification in and by the law) could arise as a result of the process, becomes 
understandable in this context. 
  
 27 That is, with a given–subsequently certainly reconstructible–failure rate, the extent 
and pretensions of which are of course again indicative of the quality of the legal culture in 
question. 
 28 First applied by the paper in note 3, as well as, also from the author: Lectures on the 
Paradigms of Legal Thinking. Budapest, 1999. 279. especially in para 6.1 on pp. 203 et seq. 
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 The final conclusion, too, will conclude from this statement above, namely 
that an integration (with ensuring unification within the European Union or 
elsewhere) will not be effectuated in terms of cultures but in ones of rules and 
instruments–in case such a process will go on at all. And this is not a pious 
wishful agenda of legal policy but a value-free statement on probabilities based 
on the foregoing. Just as I cannot grasp law as such, only its meaning(s) as 
getting asserted in practice, in the same way we cannot do anything with legal 
culture at wish either (e.g., by targetedly shaping or integrating it with some-
thing else), because, as we have seen, legal culture, too, can only manifest 
itself in nothing but continuous givings of meaning, that is, in the actuality and 
succession of conventionalised meanings. Consequently, all we can integrate 
through human intervention (and with politics by deploying artificial instru-
ments) is nothing else than kinds of objectivation we may have symbolically 
erected, in want of better means–for example, texts with their direct logical 
consequences involved. 
 
